Germany’s Airborne Capture of Italian Army Headquarters

Guido Ronconi’s Hitler’s Fallschirmjäger’s Daring Attack on the Italian Army Headquarters in 1943 offers an interesting take on a small aspect of Unternehmen Achse (Operation Axis) featuring a German paratroop assault on the Italian HQ in a small town near Rome on September 9-10, 1943.

As this event is well known but not well documented, Ronconi does his best to set the historical record straight. Ronconi spent years researching the event about which he previously wrote in Italian and, owing to difficulties with the locals, he wisely decided to publish it in English as eight chapters plus appendices, bibliography, chapter notes and an index, supported with 36 images and ten maps. The decision to suppress the Italian manuscript proved very limiting to setting the historical record straight until now. (pp. xvii-xviii)

The main story concerns the German swift attempt to neutralize “the Italian head-quarters known as Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito (SMRE, General Staff of the Royal Army) in the wake of the Italian surrender on September 8, 1943. (p. 1) This ambitious mission was just one of the many components of Unternehmen Achse (Operation Axis), an umbrella codename for the overall effort by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring to stabilize Italy amidst the sudden surrender “and to keep the war as far from Germany as possible.” (p. 13) The German reaction had to be swift and decisive, not allowing the Allies easy advantage, but handled with relatively limited resources on hand or what could be brought in like the paratroopers from France. (pp. 14-15) This was not merely a paratroop mission, but all services took part, spread across great distances, since the entire Italian military was involved. (pp. 13-16)

Accordingly, German General der Fallschirmtruppe (General of Paratroopers) Kurt Student eventually tasked the second battalion of the 2. Fallschirmjäger Division (2d Paratrooper Division) with the capture of the high-ranking officers of the SMRE in Monterotondo, about 20km from Rome. (p. 15) What followed was a typical wartime tale of missed opportunities, unnecessary deaths, and unexpected results.

The parachute jump made by Major Gericke’s II. Battalion / FJR 6 or simply II.FJR6 (2d Battalion, 6th Paratrooper Regiment) in and around Monterotondo was arguably one of the last made in the war by German troops, only followed by the 1943 Dodecanese campaign and 1944 Operation Stösser in the Ardennes. Most of the actions the Fallschirmjäger (FJ) handled after the Crete landings in 1941 came as elite light infantry without any thought of paradrops owing to the lack of air superiority, lack of transport, and other limitations.

Major Gericke got permission to drive into the Monterotondo area to conduct a subtle reconnaissance, which proved very helpful and demonstrated what a motivated leader could accomplish when lacking intelligence information. His recon plus aerial photographs helped him pick the drop zones for his battalion and the training for his troops, while maintaining absolute secrecy. (pp. 18-21)

Once the FJ moved towards the objective, they encountered strong resistance which they interpreted as protecting the Italian leadership like Marshal Pietro Badoglio or General Mario Roatta, however, when the FJ took the well-defended acting HQ at Orsoni Palace, they learned that the leaders had left. This surprised them, but the defenders suffered high losses just the same. (p. 104)

Once the HQ was captured, the much larger Italian forces in the area, including elements of the 10th Motorized Division “Piave,” 13th Infantry Division “Re”, and reinforcements from the Polizia Africa Italiana (PAI, Italian African Police) began to challenge the isolated 600-some German paratroopers for control, as the tables had turned and now they were the prey. (p. 137) Major Gericke managed to survive the battle, but it was closely run. Without negotiations taking place at other levels and under different circumstances his unit might have itself been captured or mauled.

One of the standout qualities of the book is the level of detail. Ronconi clearly did his homework and amassed impressive primary documents. The copious levels of detail with regard to the fighting and the casualties exceeds that of many books due to the exacting microscope he puts the events under. In particular, the book does not depart from what Ronconi sees as the accurate versions, regardless of whether or not it supports the traditional Monterotondo vulgata version (p. xvii) of events.

The high casualties suffered by both sides is represented in one of the appendices. That the Italians suffered almost 300 casualties (122 KIA and 156 WIA) and that roughly 20% of the II./FJR6 were also casualties (54 KIA and 78 WIA) cannot be ignored. (pp. 228-236) The need to recover canisters for their equipment, the scattered nature of the drop, accidental drownings in the Tiber River, and other factors no doubt influenced the number of casualties suffered.

Guido Ronconi’s Hitler’s Fallschirmjäger’s Daring Attack on the Italian Army Headquarters in 1943 offers a very detailed account with a wealth of information that brings to life a small but important episode among the larger events of Unternehmen Achse. Fortunately for the reader, Ronconi took time to compile a very readable, thoughtful work about Axis fratricide in WW2 in spite of the efforts of some to suppress it.

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